Logic, Epistemology and Metaphysics Seminar

Logic, Epistemology and Metaphysics Seminar
Date
11 December 2018, 5.30pm - 7.30pm
Type
Seminar
Venue
Room 246, Second Floor, Senate House, Malet Street, London WC1E 7HU
Description

Disagreement & Agnosticism

Filippo Ferrarri (Bonn)

Abstract

Can the agnostic—i.e. someone who suspends judgement about a proposition <p>—be in a state of disagreement with someone who has an attitude of (dis)belief about <p>? In this talk, I develop an account of the notions of suspended judgement and disagreement which explains how and why the agnostic is in a state of disagreement with both the believer and the disbeliever on the very same issue at hand. Following some works by Jane Friedman, I provide an account of suspended judgement as a sui generis cognitive attitude. I focus especially on developing the normative profile associated with this attitude in terms of the set of normative commitments that it engenders in the context of enquiry. I then develop a notion of disagreement based on the incompatibility between the sets of normative commitments characteristic of the three attitudes in question: belief, disbelief and suspension. In this way, I argue, we can fully explain how and why the agnostic disagrees with both the believer and the disbeliever.



The Centre for Logic and Language hosts a regular seminar series - the Logic, Epistemology and Metaphysics Forum (LEM). The forum generally meets fortnightly in term time.

Contact

Institute of Philsophy
IP@sas.ac.uk
020 7664 4865