Logic, Epistemology and Metaphysics Seminar

Logic, Epistemology and Metaphysics Seminar
26 February 2019, 5.30pm - 7.30pm
Room 246, Second Floor, Senate House, Malet Street, London WC1E 7HU

Speaker: Lavinia Picollo (UCL)

Title: Deflationism and Logical Pluralism

Abstract: I have previously argued that the function deflationists ascribe to the truth predicate is best understood as mimicking higher-order quantification in a first-order framework. This analysis has important philosophical consequences for our understanding of deflationism. In this talk I would like to explore its implications with respect to the choices of logic that are available to the deflationist. These implications will, in turn, illuminate the debate around logical pluralism, very popular these days.

Many philosophers, including deflationists and non-deflationists, have argued that since deflationism is committed to an unrestricted form of transparency (i.e. the equivalence between every sentence 'A' and ''A' is true') and the latter is inconsistent in classical logic due to the semantic paradoxes, deflationists are forced to weaken the logic to accommodate their truth principles. I reject this view. Based on the proposed analysis of the role of the truth predicate, I claim that deflationists are not committed to any logic in particular. On the contrary, they have a wide range of systems to choose from, depending on their specific aims. I conclude that deflationism motivates a logical pluralism of sorts, rather than a ban on classical logic.

The Centre for Logic and Language hosts a regular seminar series - the Logic, Epistemology and Metaphysics Forum (LEM). The forum generally meets fortnightly in term time.


Institute of Philsophy
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