Logic, Epistemology and Metaphysics Seminar

Logic, Epistemology and Metaphysics Seminar
26 March 2019, 5.30pm - 7.30pm
Room 246, Second Floor, Senate House, Malet Street, London WC1E 7HU

Speaker: Anna Drożdżowicz (University of Oslo / Institute of Philosophy)

Title: Intuitive judgements and the perceptual analogy

When describing their methodology, philosophers often speak of “intuitions” and “intuitive judgements” interchangeably, but they rarely explain whether there is a difference between these notions, and if so which one should be given most attention. According to the perceptual view (Bengson 2015; Chudnoff 2013) intuitions are a separate class of mental states with a presentational phenomenology, a feature they share with perceptual mental states. It is due to their presentational phenomenology that intuitions are argued to have an evidential role – they provide prima facie  justification for corresponding beliefs. In this talk I present one challenge for the perceptual view. I argue that it does not straightforwardly account for the evidential role of intuitive judgements, i.e. explicit verdicts/reports made about real-life and imaginary cases that philosophers use in their discourse and argumentation. I provide three observations that seem to undermine the explanatory power of the perceptual analogy between intuitions and perceptual states in justifying philosophical appeals to intuitions. I also suggest how the above challenge may guide our research in philosophical methodology.

The Centre for Logic and Language hosts a regular seminar series - the Logic, Epistemology and Metaphysics Forum (LEM). The forum generally meets fortnightly in term time.


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