Logic, Epistemology and Metaphysics Seminar

Logic, Epistemology and Metaphysics Seminar
14 May 2019, 5.30pm - 7.30pm
Room G3, Ground Floor, Senate House, Malet Street, London WC1E 7HU

Speaker: Stephan Torre (University of Aberdeen)

First-Person Imaginings
There are different ways in which imaginings can involve the first-person. I can imagine skiing down a mountain, looking down the slope, the wind whipping me in the face. I can also imagine myself skiing down a mountain from the outside, adopting the point of view of a spectator watching myself fly down the mountain. I can also imagine that I am someone else entirely, say Angela Merkel, skiing down a mountain. How can we best characterize the content of such first-person imaginings? I look at two existing accounts: one proposed by Francois Recanati and the other proposed by Dilip Ninan. I will argue that, although I think Recanati is correct in adopting a property based theory of the content of certain first-person imaginings, the account lacks the resources to model the rich and distinct types of first-person imaginings that we can have. I then turn to Ninan’s account which makes substantial progress and contains a number of insights essential to characterizing the content of imagination, but I argue it misconstrues the imagining from the inside vs. imagining from the outside distinction and conflates the content of distinct imaginings. I then propose a new account that re-construes the imagining from the inside vs. imagining from the outside distinction and is able to accommodate the various ways in which imaginings involve the first-person.

The Centre for Logic and Language hosts a regular seminar series - the Logic, Epistemology and Metaphysics Forum (LEM). The forum generally meets fortnightly in term time.


Institute of Philsophy
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