IP Guest Seminar

IP Guest Seminar
Date
16 August 2019, 5.00pm - 7.00pm
Type
Seminar
Venue
Room 246, Second Floor, Senate House, Malet Street, London WC1E 7HU
Description

 

Modal Insecurity

Tomas Bogardus (Pepperdine) 

 

Abstract

Modalists think that knowledge requires forming your belief in a “modally stable” way: using a method that wouldn’t easily go wrong (i.e. safety), or using a method that wouldn’t have given you this belief had it been false (i.e. sensitivity). Recent Modalist projects from Justin Clarke-Doane and Dan Baras defend a principle they call “Modal Security”: if evidence undermines your belief, then it must give you a reason to doubt the safety or sensitivity of your belief. Another recent Modalist project from Carlotta Pavese and Bob Beddor defends “Modal Virtue Epistemology”: knowledge is a belief that is maximally modally robust across “normal” worlds. We’ll offer new objections to these recent Modalist projects. We will then argue for a rival view, Explanationism: knowing something is believing it because it’s true. We will show how Explanationism offers a better analysis of undermining defeaters than Modalism, and a better analysis of knowledge.

Contact

Institute of Philsophy
IP@sas.ac.uk
020 7664 4865