Grasp

You can know a fact while having very little grasp of what it is that you know. You might, for example, know from Wikipedia that pycnogonids are arthropods, without having much idea what a pycnogonid is or what it is to be an arthropod. In a case like that, what is this thing you are missing — "grasp"? Arguably, it is a mind/world relation that matters even more to our understanding of inquiry than representation or knowledge. In this talk, I will survey some possible accounts of grasp, and sketch a theory of my own according to which grasp is rooted in recognitional capacities.

The Centre for Logic and Language hosts a regular seminar series - the Logic, Epistemology and Metaphysics Forum (LEM). The forum generally meets fortnightly in term time.

This seminar is supported by the ERC project MetCogCon (GA 681422)