Logic, Epistemology and Metaphysics Seminar

The Pluralist Theory of Perception

Neil Mehta (Yale-NUS College)

It is usually assumed that when I see an orange mango, my perception essentially involves at most one kind of direct awareness. Here I begin to defend the pluralist theory of perception, which says that my perception essentially involves two radically different kinds of direct awareness that are exercised in concert. First, I deploy a successful sensory representation of the mango and some of its property-instances. This explains various differences between perception and hallucination. Second, I have deep awareness of certain universals, in a way that reveals part – but not all – of their essences. This explains various similarities between perception and hallucination. In this talk, I focus especially on defending the pluralist theory as it pertains to the nature of perception itself.

The Centre for Logic and Language hosts a regular seminar series - the Logic, Epistemology and Metaphysics Forum (LEM). The forum generally meets fortnightly in term time. and is supported by the ERC project Metacognition of Concepts (GA 681422).