Values don't act like precise numbers. If they did, then whenever two things were tied in value, even the slightest sweetening of one would be enough to break the tie. And yet some ties appear to be 'insensitive to mild sweetening'. In response to this problem, Derek Parfit and Ruth Chang insist that values must be imprecise. I argue that the appeal to imprecision is both insufficient and unnecessary. The fundamental problem with using numbers is not that they are precise, but that they are one-dimensional. To press this point, I develop a model of sweetening that represents a thing's value as a precise multidimensional vector; intuitively, a 'value' is just the complete story of how good or bad something is in every relevant dimension. The result is a fresh and flexible approach to value theory—as well as an elegant definition of parity (the kind of 'tie' that can be insensitive to sweetening).
The Institute of Philosophy hosts a regular workshop series entitled ‘The Practical, the Political, and the Ethical’.
The series was created in 2015 by Véronique Munoz-Dardé (UCL) and Hallvard Lillehammer (Birkbeck) in order to discuss work in progress from visiting speakers. This year the series is convened by Elise Woodard (KCL) and Michael Hannon (Nottingham). Talks are normally 45 minutes (no pre-circulation of the paper), followed by discussion.
All are welcome.