PPE Seminar | Niko Kolodny (Berkeley): On Vacating Consent

Abstract

When you consent, in the sense in which I’m interested, to my X-ing—say, my performing surgery on you—you make it the case that I no longer owe you a “negative” duty not to X.  And when you consent to my not X-ing—say, my not aiding you—you make it the case that I no longer owe you a “positive” duty to X.  
 
This talk is part of a larger project, which suggests that there are two kinds of consent.  First, your “vacating” consent to my X-ing makes it the case that I no longer owe you a duty not to X by making it the case that my X-ing no longer sets back the interest that gave rise to the duty.  Second, your “non-vacating” consent to my X-ing makes it the case that I no longer owe you a duty to not to X without making it the case that my X-ing no longer sets back the interest that underlies the duty, while leaving that interest in place.  
 
This talk focuses on vacating consent, addressing three questions.  First, there is the question of “how consent works.” Why does your consenting to my X-ing make it the case that I no longer owe you a duty not to X?  Second, there is the question of “what consent is.”  What must take place for you to have made it the case that I no longer owe you a duty not to X, because of your consent?  Third, there is the question of “what the conditions are.”  What other conditions must be satisfied, and why must they be satisfied, in order for it to be the case that because you have consented, I do not wrong you by X-ing?
 
Among other things, I observe that my answers run counter to certain widely held views, which are often what is in mind when consent is said to be the exercise of what Joseph Raz called a “normative power” (whether it is Raz himself meant by that phrase).  I observe that while neither an overt act on your part, nor “uptake” on mine is strictly necessary for your validly consenting to my X-ing, nevertheless I wrong you by X-ing, even if you validly consent to my X-ing, unless my X-ing is suitably responsive to your valid consent.  And I observe that this account of vacating consent explains how you can consent to my X-ing even if you are ignorant of the fact that I owe you a duty not to X.

The Institute of Philosophy hosts a regular workshop series entitled ‘The Practical, the Political, and the Ethical’.
The series was created in 2015 by Véronique Munoz-Dardé (UCL) and Hallvard Lillehammer (Birkbeck) in order to discuss work in progress from visiting speakers. This year the series is convened by Elise Woodard (KCL) and Michael Hannon (Nottingham). Talks are normally 45 minutes (no pre-circulation of the paper), followed by discussion. All are welcome.